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LIMITED LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS UNDER
STATUTORY REGULATIONS
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EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

No other phase of business is more rigorously governed by
common law, with the exception of common carriers, than that
of innkeepers.' On their business, the law, as developed during
the past six centuries, has placed the strictest doctrines of liability
and responsibility, so that today, while the "reason for the rule"
is no longer existent, "the rule' nevertheless has continued to
remain in force and effect
It was the conditions of travel and the dangers to which
travelers were subjected that originally led to the strict doctrines
of liability placed on the innkeeper. In Crapo v. Rockwell,2 Justice Cochrane says: "This rigorous' rule had its origin in the
feudal conditions which were the outgrowth of the middle ages."
Exigencies of travel necessitated long and dangerous journeys
over bad roads, through unpopulated and sparsely developed
country, and the wayfarer on his journey was constantly exposed
to attacks by bandits and brigands. The inns established along
the wayside were his only place of refuge and partial protectionI say partial, because the innkeepers themselves were not beyond
temptation, having frequent opportunities of associating with the
marauders and outlaws, while the injured guest could seldom or
never obtain legal proof of such combination. 3 In fact, the innkeeper was looked upon as being nearly as dishonest as the bands
of marauders and highwaymen that infested the roads at night.
According to Pomponius, in Roman days, the Prator declared
his desire of securing the public from the dishonesty of such men,
and by his edict, permitted action against them, if the goods of
1
'An innkeeper is one who holds himself out to the public as ready to
accommodate all comers with the conveniences usually supplied to travelers on
their journey." CooLEY, TORTS (2d ed. I888) 757.
'48 Misc. I,94 N. Y. Supp. 1122 (9O5).
'BA.L,
INNKEEPERS AND HOTELs (19o6) 126; JONES, BAILMENTS (4th
ed. 1833) 95, 96.
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travellers or foreigners were lost or damaged by any means except
damno fatali, or by inevitable accident.
Therefore the law placed upon the innkepeer the duty of furnishing food, drink and lodging to anyone seeking the same (if
he refused he rendered himself liable to action). 4 In addition
the innkeeper had the important duty of protecting his guest and
his guest's property. If the traveller, while a guest at the inn,
was robbed, the law said it was from defect of care on the part of
the innkeeper, inasmuch as he undertook to protect against such a
misfortune.
In the earliest case on record 5 the loss was alleged to be "for
defect of guard of the innkeeper and servants." Blackstone
says,6 "There is also in law always an implied contract with a
common innkeeper to secure his guest's goods in his inn."
DOCTRINES OF LIABILITY IN GENERAL

Before the strict doctrines of liability attach, it must be
shown that the defendant was in fact an innkeeper. Innkeeping
is a public employment, and this characteristic distinguishes the
innkeeper from a mere boarding house keeper. Van Zile says: 7
"One who occasionally entertains travellers for compensation when it suits his pleasure, and who does not hold himself out as the keeper of a house for the accommodation of
the travelling public, is not an innkeeper. For example, persons whose houses are situated along the public roads of the
country, as farmers living on farms who occasionally or even
frequently take in and accommodate travellers and receive
compensation therefor, are not innkeepers, nor are they liable
as such, nor are keepers of restaurants and eating houses,
'Lord Esher in Robins v. Gray, [i895] 2 Q. B. 5oi, said: "If a traveller
cdmes to an inn with goods which is his luggage-I do not say his personal luggage, but his luggage-the innkeeper by the law of the land is bound to take
him and his luggage in."
"Also, if any innkeeper or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens
his house for travellers, it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons who

travel that way; and upon his universal assumpsit an action upon the case will
lie against him for damages if he without good reason refuses to admit a
traveller." 3 Br- Com. *165.
5

Y. B. 42 Ed. III, f. ii, pI. 13, 367.
Br. Com. i65.
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persons keeping lodging or boarding houses, or sleeping car 8
or steamship companies, etc., for these do not hold themselves
out as ready to furnish accommodations to all comers." 9
Kent says: 10
"The responsibility of an innkeeper for the horse or
goods of his guest, whom he receives and accommodates for
hire, has been a point of much discussion in the books. In
general, he is responsible at common law for the acts of his
domestics, and for thefts, and is found to take all due care
of the goods and baggage of his guests deposited in his house,
or entrusted to the care of his family or servants, without
subtraction or loss, day and night."
In a leading early English case 1 1 it was held that the innkeeper was bound absolutely to keep safe the goods of the guest
deposited within the inn whether the guest acquainted the innkeeper that the goods were there or not; he was bound to pay for
the goods if stolen, unless the theft Was committed by a servant
or companion of the guest. The responsibility of the innkeeper
extended to all his servants and domestics, but it did not extend to
trespasses committed upon the person of the guest nor to loss
occasioned by inevitable casualty or by superior force, as rob12
bery.
Generally no liability is imposed on the innkeeper for articles
left at the inn by the owner before or after he is a guest.' 3 Be8

Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 277 (1875).
'Entertaining strangers occasionally for compensation does not make a person an innkeeper. State v. Matthews, 2 Dev. and Bat. 424 (N. C. 1837). A
keeper of a coffee house or private boarding or lodging house is not an innkeeper in the sense of the law. Doe v. Laming, 4 Campb. 77 (Eng. 1814);
Watling v. McDowal, I BELUs COMM. 469.
"5 KENT's Comm. 593.
Calye's Case, 8 Coke 32 (1584).
"A somewhat different view of the innkeepers' responsibility, and one less
strict was expressed in Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164 (843), wherein it was
held that if the goods of a guest be deposited in a public inn and be lost or injured, the prima facie presumption is that the loss was occasioned by the loss
or negligence of the innkeeper or his servants, but the presumption may be
rebutted. An innkeeper like a common carrier is an insurer of the goods of his
guests and he can only limit his liability by express agreement or notice. Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9 (Eng. 1828) ; 5 KENT'S COMM 594.
.Glenn v. Jackson, 93 Ala. 342, 9 So. 259 (189o) ; Wear v. Gibson, 52 Ark.
364, 12 S.W. 756 (i89o); Toub v. Schmidt, 6o Hun 409, I5 N. Y. Supp. 616
(89i).
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fore liability attaches, it must clearly appear that the owner of
the lost or injured property was a guest of the inn at the time
the loss occurred and that the property was infra hospitium.
Once this is shown, the innkeeper is liable for all personal property brought by the guest into the inn. 4 However, under some
circumstances, it has been held that the innkeeper is liable as such
for the goods of the guest at the time the goods are delivered to
him or his servants, before the arrival at the inn of the prospective guest, as where the goods are previously sent by the owner to
the inn and received .by the innkeeper. 15 But such responsibility
is conditioned on the owner becoming a guest within a reasonable
time thereafter.
It is to be noted in considering this liability, that a modification arises where a guest uses his room distinctly for business
purposes, such as displaying samples, etc., for then in the event
of loss of such goods, the innkeeper is liable only as an ordinary
bailee for ordinary negligence.18
LIABILiTY GEIrERALLY IN THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO
STATUTORY REGULATIONS

It is surprising to find in the United States that on a question

which has been legally discussed for centuries, there has been so
much conflict of opinion as to the true rule for innkeepers' liability
for loss of goods. The most extreme doctrine as to liability is
" 4Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883); Johnson v. Richardson, x7
Ill. 3o2 (1855); Bershire Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 (Mass. 1851) ; Hauser v.

Tulley, 62 Pa. 92 (1869).
"The responsibility is not confined to any particular kind of goods, but extends to money and to all other classes of personal property brought by the
guest to the inn, and used by or suitable to the use of the guest." Watkins v.
Hotel Tutwiller, 2oo Ala. 386, 76 So. 302 (917).
'Flint v. Illinois Hotel Co., i49 Ill. App. 404 (igog) ; Eden v. Drey, 75 Ill.
App. io2 (1897). But see Hirsh v. Anderson Hotel Co., 58 Pa. Super. 387,
(1914) which held that where the guest and his goods did not arrive at practically the same time, the innkeeper is liable only as a gratuitous bailee, and not
as an insurer.
Meyers v. Cottrill, 5 Biss. 465 (U. S.1873) ; Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52
(i863)---'Where the property is brought to a hotel for the purpose of sale or

show, such as the goods of commercial travellers, the law does not hold an
innkeeper to his strict liability, but only to the exercise of ordinary care and
answerable for negligence." Williams v. Norwell Shapeleigh Hardware Co.,
29 Okla. 331, 116 Pac. 786 (111) ; Abercrombie v. Edwards, 62 Okla. 54, ifx.

Pac. z084 (1916).
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expressed in Hulett v. Swift, 7 in which the New York Court of
Appeals held that an innkeeper was an insurer, saying:
"An innkeeper is responsible for the safety of property
committed to his custody by a guest. He is an insurer
against loss, unless caused by the negligence or fraud of the
guest or by the act of God, or by public enemy." 1I
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Cutler v.
Bonney,19 a case involving a very similar set of facts, in which a
plaintiff sought to recover the value of a certain horse, wagon,
and goods destroyed by fire in the barn of the defendant, an innkeeper, which fire was not caused by the defendant or his servants,
took a different and more liberal view of the law, saying in its
opinion:
"In order to hold a bailee liable for that which is in no
respect reputed either to his own negligence or to that of persons for whom he is responsible, there should be found clear
authority. The common law. has declared this liability
against one class of bailees, and has made common carriers
responsible for all losses not caused by the public enemies, or
from casualty in no way arising out of human action. It is
claimed by plaintiff that in this respect common carriers and
innkeepers stand on precisely the same footing;

.

.

the

general principle seems to be that the innkeeper guarantees
the good conduct of all persons whom he admits under his
roof, provided his guests are themselves guilty of no negligence to forfeit the guarantee.

.

.

.

bailees have-been kept carefully separate."

The two classes of
20

33 N. Y. 571 (1865). For other New York cases expressing a similar
view, see Purvis v. Coleman, 21 N. Y. 1II(186o); Wells v. Steam Navigation
Company, 2 Comst. 204 (1849) ; Gile v. Libbey, 36 Barb. 70 (1861) ; Ingelsby
v. Wood, 36 Barb. 452 (1862).
$Following the case of Hulett v. Swift, the legislature of the state of

New York saw fit to pass a law modifying the liability of the innkeeper.
is 30 Mich. 359 (1874).
2* In England the extreme rule laid down in Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N.
265 (1861) still prevails, namely, that the innkeeper is liable for all loss, except
that caused by an act of God, or the Queen's enemy, or by the negligence of the
guest himself.
Judge Story in his BAILMNENTS (9th ed. 1878), §472 says:
"Innkeepers are not responsible to the same extent as common carriers,"
adding that the presumption -of negligence may be repelled by the innkeeper,
"by showing that there has been no negligence whatsoever, or that the loss is
attributable to the personal negligence of the guest himself, or that it has been
occasioned by inevitable casualty or by superior force."
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A few courts have even gone so far as to hold the innkeeper
liable only for loss of goods in the inn where he or his servants
have been personally negligent. Judge Trumball in Metcalf v.
Hess,2 1 said:

"It is a harsh rule which makes a person in any case
responsible for a loss which has occurred without any fault
of his and it can only be justified upon ground or public policy, and in consideration of the numerous opportunities
afforded by the nature of his business for fraudulent combination and clandestine dealing to the injury of the owner of
the property. The rule ought not to be extended beyond the
reason for which it originated." 22
However, the majority of the jurisdictions have imposed upon the
innkeeper the liability of an insurer, -analogous to that of a common carrier. 23 He has been held liable for all goods of the guest
lost in the inn, unless the loss has been caused by the act of God,
or a public enemy, or by the fault or negligence of the owner himself. 2 4

And as to loss occurring by theft committed by his serv-

ants, he has always been held liable.
Court said:

In Hauser v. T-idley, 25 the

"The liability of an innkeeper arises from the nature of
his employment.

.

.

.

He is bound to take proper care

of the goods, money and baggage of his guest, deposited in
his house or entrusted to the care of his family or servants,
and he is responsible for their acts as well as the acts of other
guests. If the goods of the guest are damaged in the inn, or
are stolen from it, by the servants or domestics, or by a stran1 14 Il
129 (1852).
'Howe Machine Co. v. Pease, 49 Vt. 477 (877) ; Baker v. Dessaner, 49
Ind. 28 (1874).
"Pettitt v. Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501 (1912); Watson v.
Houghton, 112 Ga. 837, 38 S. E. 82 (i9oo); Wagner v. Congress Hotel Co.,
115 Me. i9o, 98 AtI. 66o (i916); Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280 (Mass.
i83o); Parker v. Dixon, 132 Minn. 367, 157 N. W. 583 (i916); Swanner v.
Connor Hotel Co., 205 Mo. App. 329, 224 S. W. 123 (192o) ; Hulett v. Swift,

supra note 17; Palace Hotel Co. v. Medart, 87 Ohio 13o, oo N. E. 317 (912) ;
Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 262, 19 AtI. 742 (i8go); Rains v. Maxwell House Co.,
112 Tenn. 219, 79 S. W. 114 (1903).

"Watkins v. Hotel Tutwiller, supra note 14; Jones v. Savannah Hotel Co.,
I4 Ga. 530, 81 S. E. 874 (1914).

'Supra note

14.
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ger guest, he is bound to make restitution, for it is his duty
to provide honest servants and to exercise an exact vigilance
over all persons coming into his house as guests or otherwise." 26
The authorities are equally divided on the question of liability
for loss occasioned by accidental fire. It has been held that the
innkeeper is an insurer of the property of the guest during the
time the guest remains in the inn, and that he can only be excused
when the loss of such property is occasioned by the act of God, a
public enemy, or is the fault of the guest.27 Other jurisdictions,
however, have held that there is no liability for loss resulting from
an accidental fire, not attributable to the negligence or fault of the
innkeeper. This has been the modern tendency of the courts,
namely, to enlarge the limitations of the rule fixing the liability,
28
rather than to hold to the severity of it.

Where the loss occurs through the fault of the guest, his
servants, or companions, there is no liability upon the theory that
the guest is guilty of contributory negligence. Likewise, it has
been held that the guest's failure to lock or bolt the door of the
inn, when there is a lock or bolt upon it, may of itself be given to
29
the jury as evidence of negligence on the guest's part.
At common law before statutory regulation, an innkeeper
could limit his liability, but in order to do so, actual notice had
to be given the guest to the effect that he would be liable for the
goods of the guest only to a certain extent or on certain con"Walsh v. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376 (1878) ; Shultz v. Wall, supra note 23.
Even where the goods are stolen by a stranger without actual negligence
on the part of the innkeeper, the courts have held there has been a breach of the
innkeeper's obligation and that he is liable. Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587
(1883); Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 (1867); Johnson v. Richardson, mupra
note 14; Weis v. Hoffman House, 28 Misc. 225, 59 N. Y. Supp. 38 (899).
.TSee Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557 (1867); Fay v. Pacific Imp.
Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. o199 (1892) ; Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478 (1850);
Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. H. 553 (1856) ; Hulett v. Swift, supra note 17.
8See Hurlburt v. Hartman, 79 I1. App. 289 (1899); Laird v. Eichold, io
Ind. 212 (1858) ; Baker v. Dessaner, supra note 22; Vance v. Throckmorton,
5 Bush 41 (Ky. 1868); Burnham v. Young, 72 Me. 273 (1881); Cutler v.
Bonney, supra note i; Dunbar v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 12 N. W. 1og (1882);
Howe Machine Co. v. Pease, supra note 22.
Morgan v. Ravey, supra note 2o; Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186, 13
N. E. 479 (1887) ; Swann v. Smith, 14 Daly 114 (N. Y. 1887).
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ditions. 30 And where such express notice, that he must deposit
his valuables with the innkeeper or take the risk of loss, has been
given to the guest, he is negligent if he fails to comply with the
notice.31 So where a guest has been told that he must leave his
goods at the bar, but notwithstanding this warning, he kept them
in his room, and they were lost, he was barred from recovery by
his negligence.32 However, in the absence of statutory authority,
an innkeeper cannot limit his liability by a general, public, or con3
structive notice, not brought to the guests' knowledge.
LIABILITY UNDER STATUTORY REGULATIONS

Today many states have passed statutes regulating and limiting the liability of innkeeperi who comply with the terms and
provisions thereof. Likewise, a responsibility is now placed upon
the guest which he heretofore did not have. Prior to statutory
regulation, the innkeeper, like the common carrier, could make
reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of his business,
but these rules could not effect the nature or extent of his obligation, as, for instance, his liability for loss of goods, under any
circumstances, for that would be open to the same objection as
contracts limiting liability. These rules and regulations could,
however, so far as they were reasonable, affect the conduct of
34
himself and his guests.
The statutes of the various states require the innkeeper to
keep a safe deposit box for guests. Furthermore, statutes limiting the innkeeper's liability always provide for the posting of
notice of the limitations, which provisions must be expressly complied with. Thus a notice required to be printed "in ordinary
sized plain English type," is not complied with by printing it in
very small type, even though the guest could just as easily have
read it.3 3 And where the statute requires that notice should be
posted, it is not enough to print the notice at the head of the reg"Wilson v. Halpin, i Daly 496 (N. Y. 1865); Nesben v. Jackson, 89 W.
Va. 470, iog S. E. 489 (1921).
"Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 (1874).
,' Wilson v. Halpin, supra note 3o.
SPalas v. Harvey Room Co., 211 Ill. App. 58o (I918).
'*.Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith, 88 (N. Y. 1855).
Porter v. Gilkey, 57 Mo. 235 (1874).

28o
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ister in which a guest signs his name, 6 and this will not exempt
the innkeeper from liability under the statute.
An exception is to be noted in the New York case of Purvis
v. Coleman, 7 in which the innkeeper had failed to post notices in
the rooms of the guests as required by the statute, but the plaintiff
had been actually informed by a waiter that guests should deposit
valuables in a safe in the office founded for that purpose. The
court in holding that an action for the loss of his money was
barred by the statute said:
"The notice which the statutes require is merely constructive, since it is evident that a notice posted up in the
room of a guest may wholly escape his attention, yet he is not
permitted to aver his ignorance, but is bound by that presumption which the statute raises. When the facts raising
the presumption are proved, his recovery is barred. It is
true the statute is silent as to the effect of actual notice, but
we cannot believe that the legislature intended that a greater
effect should be attributed to the presumed knowledge of a
guest than to its actual proof-that while the presumption
bars his recovery, the proof must be rejected or disregarded.
Such a construction of the intention of the legislature would
be most unreasonable

.

.

. and the meaning of the stat-

ute we hold to be-that the knowledge of a guest who has
failed to deposit his money, or jewelry, in a safe, that he
knew to be provided, would defeat his claim for a subsequent
loss, and that such is its consequence, whether the knowledge
be established by direct or positive, or merely presumptive
evidence."
This decision has been much criticised in later cases, and several
courts have declined to follow it. Thus in Batterson v. Vogel,8 8
it was held that an innkeeper who had failed to post a notice in
the guest's room as required by the act was nevertheless liable
even though it appeared that the guest had read a copy of the act
on the register, since the act did not provide that actual knowledge
of the provisions of the act should take the place of posting. 9
Olson v. Crossman, 31 Minn. 222, 17 N. W. 375 (1883); Batterson v.
Vogel, 8 Mo. App. 24 (1879).
"SuPra note 17.
'Sipra note 36.
"See Lanier v. Youngblood, supra note 26; Porter v. Gilkey, supra note 35-
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This seems to be the better view, since such a statute is in derogation of the common law and should therefore be strictly construed
against the innkeeper who is attempting, in reliance upon it, to
relieve himself from an obligation towards his guest, which the
common law would impose.
Certain duties have also been placed upon the guest by these
statutory regulations, and we will now consider under what circumstances the innkeeper is still liable as at common law.
Where the guest has complied with the terms of the statute
by depositing his valuables with the innkeeper, the innkeeper
remains liable for same as at common law. 40 But let us suppose
the guest is likewise guilty of negligence. Under what circumstances will that bar a recovery? It has-been held that where, by
virtue of a notice posted under authority of the statutes, a guest
must lock his door, a guest who has failed to comply with the
terms of said notice, and loses goods from his room, is not barred
from recovery beeause of his failure to follow the regulation,
unless such failure was the cause of the loss. 41 Thus where a
guest was required to lock his door at night, and he failed to do
so and his goods were stolen at night by another guest placed in
innkeeper, it was held
the room, in spite of his objections, by the
42
loss.
that the guest might recover for his

Furthermore, when must the deposit by the guest with the
innkeeper be made to prevent the former's being considered negligent for having failed to do so? The deposit need not be made
at the very moment of the guest's arrival. A reasonable time
may elapse for the guest to deposit his valuables, and during that
time the innkeeper remains liable at common law in spite of the
statute. 43 Likewise, the guest must have a reasonable time in
which to collect, pack, and remove his property, previous to his
departure from the inn, and after the goods have been given to
40

Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172 (187o); Green v. Windsor Hotel Co.,

26 Que. Super. 97.

"'Rockhill v. Congress Hotel Co., 237 Ill. 98, 86 N. E. 740 (i9o8) ; Burbank v. Chopin, 140 Mass. 123, 2 N. E. 934 (1885) ; Bendetson v. French, 46
N. Y. 266 (1871).
'Gile v. Libbey, supra note 17.
"See Becker v. Haynes, 29 Fed. 441 (1887); Rosenplaenter v. Roeselle,
54 N. Y. 262 (1873).
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the guest for that purpose, the innkeeper is responsible for such
goods as at common law. 4
A much discussed question is whether, under a statute limiting liability, it is necessary to deposit all goods with the innkeeper
in order to enforce his responsibility for the goods, or only certain
classes of goods which can be spared. Several states have covered this point by the express language of their statutes. Thus in
Pennsylvania,4 5 the statute provides that the exemption should not
apply to "such an amount of money and such articles of goods,
jewelry, and valuables, as is usual, common and prudent for the
guest or boarder to retain in his room or about his person." Similar provisions are contained in the statutes of Delaware, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming. As to
the articles so excepted, the common law liability remains, in spite
of the notices.4" Other states 47 specify by the provisions of their
statutes that the liability of the inrkeeper can only be limited in
the case of specific articles, such as money, jewelry,48 documents,
and other articles of great value, and the innkeeper can only
require these articles to be deposited in his safe.
But what is the liability of an innkeeper where goods of a
guest have not been deposited with the innkeeper as required by
statute, and are lost as a result of the negligence of the innkeeper
or his servants? Let us consider a hypothetical case. John Smith
registers as a guest at a hotel, which has complied with all the
requirements of a statute as to maintaining a safe deposit box,
giving due notice of limitations, etc. The statute requires that
the guest deposit all valuables, such as jewelry, etc., with the hotel
"Bendetson v. French, supra note 41.
"5Actof May 7, 1855, P. L. 479, PA. STAT. (1920) § 11,935. See also Act
of June 12, 1913, P. L. 481, PA. STAT. (1920) § 11,935.
'Turner v. Whitaker, 9 Pa. Super. 83 (1898).
4T California, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
" The cases differ on the question whether a watch and chain come within
the description "jewels and ornaments" or similar language of the statute. In
Maryland and New York it has been held that they do not, but that the innkeeper is responsible for them in spite of the statute and notice. See Maltby
v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310 (1866) ; Bernstein v. Sweeney, 33 N. Y. Superior 271
(1871); Ramalay v. Leland, 43 N. Y. 539 (1871).
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in safe deposit boxes provided for that purpose. Smith on going
to his room at night fails to deposit his valuable jewelry with the
hotel, but retains the same in his room. He locks his door before
retiring. During the night, an employee of the hotel enters his
room with a pass key and steals his jewelry. Subsequently on
being arrested, the employee admits the theft, but has meanwhile
disposed of the jewelry and cannot make good the loss. Is the
hotel keeper liable for the loss sustained by the guest occasioned
by the wrongful act of his employee?
Of course, it is important to consider the provisions of the
statute applicable in each case. Statutes in some of our states
expressly provide that the innkeeper shall remain liable as at common law if the loss occurs ihrough his or his servants' negligence.4 9 However, we will consider that our hypothetical case is
controlled by a statute which does not contain such a provision.
Turning to cases which might govern the assumed set of
facts, we find none that is similar to our hypothetical case, especially on the point that the loss was admittedly caused by a wrongful act of the, innkeeper's employee. Probably the nearest case in
point is that of Jones v. Savannah Hotel Co.,50 in which case a
female guest had retired for the night, and, before doing so, took
from her person the following articles, which she 'had been wearing for personal adornment and which were suitable to her station
in life, and placed them upon the bureau in her room: five diamond rings, one watch-bracelet, one topaz chain and watch. During the night all these articles were stolen from the room by some
person unknown. The innkeeper had an iron safe for the deposit
of valuable articles, and had posted in the room of the guest the
notice required by statute.
The court was asked two questions. First, was the guest
entitled to recover from the innkeeper the value of the property
stolen. Second, if the articles were such as were within the purview of the statute, would the guest, notwithstanding any negligence in her failure to deposit the articles in the innkeeper's safe,
' Edward House v. Davis, 124 Miss. 485, 86 So. 849 (i92o) ; Busley v. Hotel
Wisconsin Realty Co., x66 Wis. 294, .164 N. W. 826 C097).
'Supra note 24.
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be entitled to recover, if it appeared that the articles were stolen in
consequence of the negligence of the innkeeper either in failing to
provide a suitable lock on the door, or in placing a fire escape in
such a manner as to afford easy access to the room of the guest
from the street below? The court answering the first question
said:
"The language of the code section is explicit. The innkeeper had an iron safe for the deposit of valuable articles.
He posted the notice required by the statute. .
. The
guest had valuable articles consisting of diamond rings,
bracelet, watch and chain, which were not deposited in the
iron safe, but kept in the room of the guest and were stolen.
It is perfectlr clear therefore that the innkeeper was relieved
of responsibility for them.
"It may seem somewhat of a hardship to require a traveler on retiring at night to deposit articles like those involved
in the present case; but the statute is absolute and must be
complied with, else the innkeeper will be relieved from liability for the loss of such articles. " The statute was not enacted
for the benefit of travellers; for without it they could rely
upon the common law liability of the innkeeper. Its purpose
was to relieve the stringent rule of the common law so as to
permit the innkeeper to protect himself against liability under
certain circumstances."
.

In answer to the second question the court said:
"As the statute declares that the inkeeper will be relieved
from responsibility for valuable articles belonging to his
guest if he provides an iron safe or other place of deposit for
such articles, and posts a notice in accordance with the statute, requiring his guest to place such articles in the safe or
other place of deposit, it must follow, where the innkeeper
has complied with the requirements of the statute, thus relieving himself from responsibility for such articles, that a
guest who failed to comply with such notice could not recover
from the innkeeper if it appeared that the articles were stolen
in consequence of the negligence of the latter, either in failing
to provide a suitable lock on the door of the room occupied
by the guest, or in placing a fire-escape in such a manner as
to afford easy access to the room from the street below. Had
the guest complied with the notice, and thereafter the innkeeper had failed to use the measure of diligence required by
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the statute, he would have been liable. To hold that, without
complying with the requirements of the notice authorized by
the statute, the guest could nevertheless recover as to articles
covered by the notice, merely by showing want of diligence
on the part of the innkeeper in the respect named, would
practically make the statute nugatory."
It is interesting to note that in other cases involving somewhat similar facts, the courts have swung from the strict doctrine
holding the ;- 'keeper liable under nearly all circumstances and
have now begtu, to place a distinct responsibility on the guest,
which if not performed will bar the guest's recovery for loss, the
courts construing the statutes to have been adopted for the benefit
of the hotel keepers and not for the guests. On this point, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case of Rains v. Maxwell
House Co.,51 said:
"If a guest sees proper to keep his watch and fob and
money upon his person or in his room, he does it at his own
risk, just as he keeps about his person and in his possession
when not in the hotel. If he desires for his own safety or
convenience to place the responsibility for its safe keeping
upon the hotel keeper during his stay at the hotel as a guest,
then he must place it in the safe which the statute requires to
be provided by the innkeeper for that purpose. We can put
no other construction upon the statute without nullifying
wholly or to some extent its provisions. It may be inconvenient to deposit small sums of money and pieces of jewelry
of little value in the safe of a hotel, and it may be inconvenient to do without their use during the stay of the guest; but
this is a condition to the statute, upon which the hotel keeper
can alone be made liable for their safety as an insurer. If a
guest desires to avoid these inconveniences, he may retain
possession of his money and his jewelry, just as if he were
not a guest of the hotel."
Probably the most succinct expression of the law is found in the
opinion of the court in Weis v. Hoffman House,5 2 wherein it was
stated:
Supra note 23.
Supra note 26.
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"It is said that such statutes are to be construed not so
much as limiting or modifying the extraordinary liability,
but as making the guest chargeable with negligence if he
omits to avail himself of the means afforded for the protection of his property. The liability of the innkeeper is the
same but the failure of the guest to comply with the statute
will be such negligence as will defeat the enforcement of the
liability."
In conclusion it may be said that today, under modern conditions of travel, with the "reason for the rule" no longer present,
the legislatures of the various states and the courts in interpreting
the statutes enacted by these legislative bodies, are slowly breaking
down "the rule" -of strict liability of innkeepers, which rule originally arose because of conditions which are no longer existent.

